Sergej Lavrov - © lev radin/Shutterstock
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Armenia last week, signalling a potential thaw in ties after years of some strain. Prime Minister Pashinyan now appears to be pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy, balancing relations with both Russia and the West ahead of the 2026 elections
On 20 May, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid an official visit to Yerevan, the Armenian capital. He met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, President Vahagn Khachaturyan, and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan.
The visit came following Pashinyan's attendance at the annual Victory Day celebrations held in Moscow on 9 May. Last year, Pashinyan declined to attend given growing antagonism between the two countries following the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war when Yerevan harboured unrealistic hopes that Moscow would intervene militarily on its side in such a conflict.
However, fighting over the then mainly ethnic Armenian-populated former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) took place not within Armenia’s official border but deep inside neighbouring Azerbaijan.
In recent months, Pashinyan has started to tone down his rhetoric on Russia, especially since the return of U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House. If the calculus had been that following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 Moscow would be too distracted and militarily weakened to pay sufficient attention to its near abroad in the South Caucasus, that has now changed.
Despite the hope to pivot Armenia’s foreign and economic policy towards the West, including an unlikely proclamation that it would one day join the European Union, it now appears that the Armenian government is adopting a more pragmatic course of action – diversifying its options rather than replacing them. Armenia relies heavily on Russia for trade and also heavily discounted energy for decades to come.
Nonetheless, despite the apparent thaw, Russia continues to push back against a more assertive European Union role in the region while also attempting to restore its strategic influence in Armenia as a still elusive peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains at least still possible in 2026 or most likely 2027.
The prize here for all regional and international actors is the eventual unblocking of all trade and transit routes in the region, many of which collapsed because of the Karabakh conflict. The European Union, as well as the United States under the former Biden administration, has even made it clear that it seeks to expand transit through Turkiye, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to gradually lesson Russia’s influence in Central Asia.
The matter is especially sensitive for Pashinyan given that he faces re-election in mid-2026 with few of his campaign promises from the previous 2021election fulfilled.
During recent local electionsheld in March in the country’s second largest city of Gyumri, a controversial pro-Russian former head returned to power with the support of various opposition group whose only aim was to prevent Pashinyan’s candidate from retaining control over the municipality. Even an ostensibly pro-Pashinyan and pro-Western alliance of extra-parliamentary parties failed to pass the six percent threshold for representation.
Later, on 22 May, when the government signalled that it did not plan to leave the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), one of the pro-EU alliance’s leaders accused Pashinyan of halting the claimed process only in order not to lose votes in next year’s elections.
Further, when a Pashinyan official asked if Armenia still intends to become an EU member in the distant future, the answer was blunt. “I think Armenia's most fundamental goal […] is to sign a peace treaty with internationally recognised borders of 29,743 kilometres”, a clear allusion to the elusive peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Though the text was finalised in March, it is unclear when it will be signed given Baku’s insistence that Yerevan first changes its constitution. Until then, progress on the related normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkiye has stumbled. The normalisation of Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkiye was high on the agenda for Lavrov’s visit to Yerevan when he again highlighted the importance of nascent 3+3 platform in which the region focuses on its own stability, security, and future. Comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkiye, only Georgia has declined to join given its own issues with Moscow.
“On the whole, we are satisfied with the results of our negotiations”, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told media after his meeting with Mirzoyan. “Our belief is that we are bound with the Russian Federation by a strong partnership”, he said. “We have growing commercial […] strong cultural ties,” Mirzoyan added. Lavrov did, however, claim that Armenia’s new focus on acquiring weapons from France and particularly India did not concern it.
On 23 May, Pashinyan also announced that the next European Political Community (EPC) summit would be next year in Armenia. This could also boost Pashinyan’s chances in next year’s elections if he can demonstrate how he has navigated Armenia’s complex geopolitical situation.
Meanwhile, during this week’s official visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Moscow for talks with Moscow, the need for establishing peace and stability, including unblocking regional transport and communications in the South Caucasus, is expected to be among items on the agenda, including the 3+3 format which, according to Lavrov in comments made on 21 May, might next time be held in Baku or Yerevan.
At the last EPC in Albania earlier this month, the leaders and foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan were also filmed in discussion during a break. Azerbaijan will host the EPC in 2027 but the potential for multiple tracks if geopolitical interests can be controlled.
On 26 May, at the Yerevan Dialogue conference, held under the theme of “Navigating the Unknown,” Armenia’s reality today was clear. Faced with the unknown, Yerevan must maintain parity and keep in mind shared rather than competing foreign interests.
